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THE HOT CARGO AGREEMENT IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT
CONTRACTS - FROM CONWAY'S EXPRESS
TO NATIONAL WOODWORK
by George E. Seay, Jr.
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act,' passed in 1947, was
designed to outlaw secondary boycotts. Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act,
boycotts had long been used by unions to aid each other during labor dis-
putes and strikes. The most common technique employed was to strike
plant A which was handling or receiving the goods produced by plant B
when the latter was involved in a labor dispute, a strike, or was classed as
unfair by the union. Since the labor dispute at the producing plant did
not involve the plant A employees, their strike was a secondary boycott
or sympathy strike designed to exert extra pressure on the management of
plant B.' Section 8 (b) (4) (A)' prohibited this type of strike by declaring
it unlawful for a union to induce or encourage employees to engage in a
strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to handle
products, for the purpose of forcing one employer to stop doing business
with another employer.
In order to avoid the effects of this section, unions began to include
"hot cargo" clauses in their collective bargaining agreements with man-
agement. The typical clause stipulates that the employer will not handle
or use goods which are not union made or which are manufactured by a
company considered to be unfair by the union. The employer also agrees
not to require employees to use or handle these goods.4 With the use of
hot cargo clauses by unions came the question as to whether the agree-
ment, when put into practice, was, in effect, a secondary boycott which
is prohibited by section 8 (b) (4) (A); or, whether the agreement con-
taining the clause was a valid defense to a secondary boycott charge.
'Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1964). Section 8(b)(4)(A) became 8(b)(4)(B) when the Act was
amended in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-68 (1964).
'See Note, Hot Cargo Clauses as a Defense to Union-Induced Secondary Boycotts, 61 W. VA.
L. REv. 118 (1959) for a more detailed discussion of this effect.
3 Section 8 (b) (4) (A) when enacted stated:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage
in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufac-
ture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials,
or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing
or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer
organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; . .."
29 U.S.C. § 18(b)(4)(A) (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b)(4)(B) (1964).
'A typical hot cargo clause might read: "Employees have the right to refuse to handle material
which the company purchases from any supplier whose employees are on strike because of a labor
dispute." See Note, supra note 2, at 120.
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As justification for the use of the hot cargo clause the argument was
made that since the employer consented to the boycotting of the goods,
the section 8 (b) (4) (A) element of "forcing or requiring ' an employer
to discontinue his business with other persons was absent. Proponents of
this view also argued that unions could legally persuade the employer
to engage in a secondary boycott.'
Opponents of hot cargo agreements argued that the intention of Con-
gress in enacting section 8 (b) (4) (A) was not only to protect the sec-
ondary employer, but also the general public who would be affected by the
boycott." If Congress' purpose was to protect the public, then an employer
could not contractually waive the statutory protection, for to do so would
deprive the public of its statutory safeguard without its consent.! There-
fore, it was argued that the hot cargo clause was outlawed by the broad
legislative purpose of section 8 (b) (4) (A).9
I. THE HOT CARGO AGREEMENT BEFORE THE NLRB
The first important case to come before the National Labor Relations
Board was Local 294, Teamsters (Conway's Express) in 1949.1" In Con-
way three companies1 entered a contract with the Teamsters Union where-
by the union reserved the right to refuse to handle the goods of any em-
ployer engaged in a labor dispute. The employees of each of the three
companies were persuaded to discontinue handling Conway's freight
when the Conway employees went on strike. Each of the three employers,
in accordance with his contract, agreed and abided by the employees' de-
cision to refuse to handle the Conway "hot cargo." Conway took the case
before the National Labor Relations Board and claimed that this action
was prohibited under section 8 (b) (4) (A) 1" of the Taft-Hartley Act and
was an unfair labor practice by the unions that represented the secondary
employees. The Board, following the argument advanced by the propon-
ents of the clause, held that the union action did not constitute an unfair
labor practice because the secondary employers were not "forced or re-
quired"' 3 to cease doing business with the primary employer within the
meaning of section 8 (b) (4) (A). The Board reasoned that since section
8 (b) (4) (A) prohibited forcing or requiring any person to cease dealing
with another person, it could not be used to prohibit this type of agree-
ment because the employer was never "forced or required," but consented
to the action. The Board also concluded that section 8 (b) (4) (A) only
529 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (1964). Since the original § 8(b)(4)(A) has now become §
8 (b) (4) (B) the footnotes will refer to the section in its present form of citation.
6This must be assumed since § 8(b)(4)(A) is silent on the matter of a union inducing em-
ployers as opposed to employees. See Local 294, Teamsters (Conway's Express), 87 N.L.R.B. 972
(1949).
'The boycotts exert a harmful effect on the economy due to their disruptive effect on the flow
of goods in commerce.
SSee 22 NLRB ANN. REP. 148 (1957).
o See Note, supra note 2.
'0 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949).
'1 Palmer Lines, Central Warehouse, and Oppenheimer were the companies involved.




applied to inducement of employees and since the demand for the boycott
was made to the secondary employers, this element was clearly lacking.
The Board stated:
It is evident from these facts that the three secondary employers, in effect,
consented in advance to boycott Conway's. As they consented, their em-
ployees' failure to deliver freight to or accept freight from Conway trucks
was not in the literal sense a 'strike' or 'refusal' to work, nor was any such
concerted insubordination contemplated by the Respondent when it caused
the employees to exercise their contractual privilege. In the circumstances,
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) cannot apply, unless we accept the General Counsel's
argument that the 'hot cargo' contracts were repugnant to the policy of the
amended Act and therefore invalid after the effective date of the 1947 amend-
ments. But we find no merit in this argument. 4
One member of the Board dissented, contending that the Act forbids
secondary boycott activity on the part of unions, and therefore, if a
clause in a contract attempts to authorize this activity, it is inconsistent
with the public policies of the Act."
In 1953, four years after the Board's decision in Conway's Express, the
question of hot cargo agreements again came before the Board in Chauf-
feurs Local 135 (Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.). ' In Pittsburgh Plate Glass
the Board in effect reaffirmed its earlier decision on hot cargo agreements,
although here the Board was presented with the additional problem of in-
ducement and encouragement of the secondary employees by the union.
The Board held that if an employer and a union agree to include a hot
cargo clause in their collective bargaining agreement, section 8 (b) (4) (A)
is not applicable because the secondary employees' failure to handle the
goods is not a strike or concerted refusal under the section. The Board
found that since the agreement exempted employees from performing
their required duties in regard to "unfair goods" these duties were not "in
the course of their employment" as expressly required by the section."
After the Board rulings in Conway's Express and Pittsburgh Plate
Glass and acquiescence by the Second Circuit," it appeared that the con-
troversy over hot cargo agreements had been conclusively determined. If
a union could persuade an employer to include a hot cargo clause in their
collective bargaining agreement, the union would then have potential
freedom in the area of secondary boycotts.
Although the matter seemed settled, employers still continued to file
charges of illegal secondary activity in an attempt to have the Board re-
consider the issues. Shortly after Pittsburgh Plate Glass the controversy
was reopened in Local 608, Teamsters (McAllister Transfer, Inc.)." The
McAllister Transfer Corporation, an interstate motor carrier, filed charges
against the Teamsters, claiming that the union was violating the Act by
engaging in secondary activities. The controversy arose when McAllister
'4 87 N.L.R.B. at 982.
5 87 N.L.R.B. at 988, 995 (dissent of Member Reynolds).
105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953).
17 Id.
"Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
19 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954).
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refused to recognize the Teamsters as their employees' bargaining agent.
The Teamsters ordered the employees of other interstate common car-
riers to discontinue handling McAllister's freight upon arrival at the
docks. Although the employees of the secondary carriers were under a
collective bargaining contract that included a hot cargo clause, the sec-
ondary employers, disregarding the contract, directed their employees to
handle the McAllister freight shipments. The employees refused and as a
result the movement of freight from McAllister was suspended.
The McAllister case came before the Board in 1959 and was ultimately
decided by Board Chairman Farmer when the other four members dead-
locked. Two Board members believed that section 8 (b) (4) (A) pro-
hibited all secondary boycotts and was enacted for the protection of the
primary employer and the public as well as the secondary employers. The
other two members of the Board felt that since the employers had con-
sented in advance to the boycott there was no strike or refusal to handle
goods under the statute. In breaking the deadlock Farmer determined that
section 8 (b) (4) (A) was enacted solely for the protection of the second-
ary employers against involvement in labor disputes outside of their com-
pany. '* Therefore, if the secondary employer wished to respect the hot
cargo clause and consented to his employee's refusal to handle the dis-
favored goods, there was no strike or refusal within the meaning of the
statute. However, under Farmer's rationale if the employer decided not to
honor the hot cargo clause and ordered his employees to handle the unfair
goods, any union-induced work stoppage was violative of section
8 (b) (4) (A) because the essential element of defiance or insubordination
was present. Under this reasoning the important element was whether the
employer chose to honor the hot cargo clause when the union and the
employees wished to invoke it and thereby participate in a concerted
refusal to handle the hot cargo."
Several years later the problem of hot cargo clauses again came to the
Board's attention in Local 1976, Carpenters (Sand Door & Plywood Co.)"5
and General Drivers Local 886 (American Iron & Machine Works Co.)."
The Board, following the McAllister case, again held that the hot cargo
clauses did not remove secondary work stoppages induced by unions from
the reach of section 8 (b) (4) (A) unless honored by the employer. The
Board also held that since the statute did expressly prohibit union induce-
ment of employees to engage in work stoppages, a union was barred from
appealing directly to the employees, regardless of the approval or non-
approval of the employer. However, the employer might instruct his em-
ployees to cease handling the disfavored goods.'
In 1958 the question again came before the Board in Truck Drivers
21 Id. at 1777.1 See Fenton, Hot Cargo and the Taft-Hartley Act, 31 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 153, 155 (1958).
22 113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955).
a115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956).
2 A third member of the three-man majority held that the Union had committed an unfair
labor practice on the ground that hot cargo agreements are invalid as contrary to public policy and
therefore cannot be a defense to conduct otherwise proscribed by the statute. Local 1976, Carpenters
(Sand Door & Plywood Co.), 113 N.L.R.B. 1210, 1219 (1955).
[Vol. 21
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Local 728 (Genuine Parts Co.)," which involved a secondary employer
who was a common carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act and
who had entered into a hot cargo agreement with a union. The Board
reversed its earlier decisions and held that the clause was not a defense
to secondary boycott charges against the union. Two members of the ma-
jority based their decision on the theory that a common carrier cannot
agree to boycott a shipper and remain true to its obligation under the
Interstate Commerce Act which requires service to the public without dis-
crimination. " The third member of the majority based his decision" on
the belief that hot cargo clauses were invalid as against public policy and
therefore could not be used as a defense to prosecution for activity pro-
hibited by the statute.
Just as there had been a conflict in the decisions of the Board, a similar
disagreement existed among the circuit courts of appeals that dealt with
the hot cargo issue. Between 1952 and 1958 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia " and the Second Circuit"0 adopted the Board's posi-
tion in Conway's Express and held the agreements a valid defense to sec-
ondary boycott charges. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
Board's decisions in American Iron and Sand Door,"5 that a secondary boy-
cott pursuant to a hot cargo agreement was an unfair labor practice.
Finally the issue came before the Supreme Court after eight years of liti-
gation before the Board and the Circuit Courts of Appeals. The case was
Local 1976, Carpenters (Sand Door & Plywood Co.)."5
II. SAND DOOR-THE REQUIREMENT OF EMPLOYER REAFFIRMANCE
The Sand Door case arose out of a labor dispute between the carpenters'
union and an employer engaged in the building construction trade. The
Sand Door and Plywood Company was exclusive distributor of Paine
Lumber Company doors. Havstad and Jensen, general contractors em-
ployed to construct a hospital in Los Angeles, were at the time of the
dispute parties to a contract with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America. This agreement contained a hot cargo provision
to the effect that "workmen shall not be required to handle non-union
s 1 1 9 N.L.R.B. 399 (1957).
26id. at 404.
27 1d. at 425.
28 The Interstate Commerce Commission also was faced with the hot cargo clause in Galveston
Truck Lines Corp. v. Ada Motor Lines, 73 I.C.C. 617 (1958), in which a group of common carriers
refused to take interline traffic sent to them by the complainant who was involved in a labor dispute
with the Teamsters. The carriers' defense was based on their labor contracts which granted their
employees the right to refrain from handling unfair goods or the goods of an unfair company. The
ICC held that it was without the power to rule on the legality of hot cargo agreements since these
agreements affect labor relations between employers and employees, a subject matter reserved to the
National Labor Relations Board. The ICC did hold that a common carrier cannot bargain away its
statutory duty owed to the public to provide responsible service and facilities for the transportation
of goods in interstate commerce.
2 Local 1886, General Drivers v. NLRB, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"
5Milk Drivers Union v. NLRB, 245 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1957); Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d
906 (2d Cir. 1952).
3' NLRB v. Local 1976, Carpenters (Sand Door & Plywood Co.), 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957).
"
mLocal 1976, Carpenters (Sand Door & Plywood Co.) v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). This
case was consolidated with NLRB v. Local 886, General Drivers Union, and Local 850, International
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, which were two other cases involving the same issue.
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material."' In August of 1954 doors manufactured by Paine and pur-
chased by the Sand Door Company were delivered to the hospital con-
struction area. The union notified the contractors, Havstad and Jensen,
that the doors were manufactured by a non-union company (Paine)
and therefore could not be hung. Havstad and Jensen complied with this
request and negotiations commenced between Sand Door and the union.
Upon failing to reach an agreement which would allow the doors to be
hung, Sand Door filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board
and a complaint was issued. The Board ruled that the petitioner union had
induced and encouraged employees to engage in a concerted refusal to
handle Paine's doors for the purpose of forcing Havstad and Jensen to
terminate their business relationship with Sand Door which conduct was
a violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
enforced the Board's cease and desist order' and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari." The question presented to the Court was whether a hot
cargo clause constituted a defense under section 8 (b) (4) (A) to a union-
induced secondary boycott. The union argued that although section
8 (b) (4) (A) was enacted to protect neutrals from becoming involuntar-
ily involved in labor disputes, the statute should not extend to a party
who has voluntarily agreed to the strike, particularly when that employer
does nothing at the time of the boycott to repudiate the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The Court held that while there was no broad prohibi-
tion of these agreements in section 8(b) (4) (A) 37 compliance or non-
compliance with the hot cargo clause was a choice for the employer to
make at the time the boycott arose and, therefore, the employer could
not make a binding agreement to boycott in advance. This pressure-free
choice must be available to the contracting employer as a matter of fed-
eral policy, regardless of a prior agreement between the parties." Thus,
the Supreme Court in the Sand Door decision modified the Conway doc-
trine by requiring reaffirmance on the part of the employer at the time
of the dispute. Hot cargo clauses were not outlawed per se by the ruling
which stated that:
There is nothing in the legislative history to show that Congress directly
considered the relation between hot cargo provisions and the prohibitions of
8 (b) (4) (A). Nevertheless, it seems most probable that the freedom of
choice for the employer contemplated by 8 (b) (4) (A) is a freedom of choice
at the time the question whether to boycott or not arises in a concrete situa-
tion calling for the exercise of judgment on a particular matter of labor and
business policy. Such a choice, free from the prohibited pressures-whether
to refuse to deal with another or to maintain normal business relations on the
ground that the labor dispute is no concern of his-must as a matter of
federal policy be available to the secondary employer notwithstanding any
private agreement entered into between the parties."8
MId. at 95.
34 113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955).
5241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957).
m355 U.S. 808 (1957).
37 29 U.S.C. 5 158 (b) (4) (B) (1964).




The status of the hot cargo agreement after the Sand Door decision
seemed to have been defined. A secondary employer could still voluntarily
engage in a boycott for his own business purposes and a union could still
approach an employer and attempt to persuade him to engage in a boycott,
but the union was prohibited from inducing the employees to refuse to
handle the goods. Sand Door thus rejected the idea that the congressional
purpose in enacting section 8 (b) (4) (A) was to give the primary em-
ployer or the general public full protection against a secondary boycott.'
III. SECTION 8 (e) OF THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT-CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE TO SAND DOOR
Under the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 the NLRB and federal court deci-
sions on hot cargo agreements revealed several different approaches. These
ranged from the liberal approach,4 validating the agreement, to the strict
view that a hot cargo clause was illegal per se; to the compromise posi-
tion,4 approved by the Supreme Court in the Sand Door case, that the
clause was valid, but that it could not immunize from section 8 (b) (4) (A)
a strike, or inducement of employees to engage in a work stoppage, unless
voluntarily agreed to by the employer.'
Congressional response to this situation was section 8 (e) " of the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act" which provides that a hot cargo agreement is illegal
per se and unenforceable. The creation of such an agreement is made an
unfair labor practice47 and a union is forbidden to use methods proscribed
in section 8 (b) (4) (A) to force an employer to enter into a hot cargo
agreement." Under section 8 (e) it is an unfair labor practice:
for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or
agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or
agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or other-
wise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing
business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforcible and void .... ."
However, section 8 (e) of the Landrum-Griffin Act"0 specifically ex-
cludes some industries from the blanket prohibition against hot cargo
agreements.5' For example, section 8 (e) declares:
"For a discussion of some of the problems left open, see Fenton, supra note 21, at 161.
41 See Comment, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 724, 739 (1960).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44Local 1976, Carpenters (Sand Door & Plywood Co.) v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
45 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) [hereinafter referred to as section 8 (e)].
4"73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
47 Section 8 (e) is retroactive in effect and therefore hot cargo contracts entered into prior to
the amendment are invalidated. See Comment, supra note 41.
4873 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (A) (1964).
4973 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
"'29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964). Under the Landrum-Griffin Act the old § 8(b) (4) (A) became
8 (b) (4) (B) and a new § 8 (b) (4) (A) was inserted which made it an unfair labor practice to
force an employer to enter into an agreement prohibited by § 8 (e).
"i See Farmer, The Status and Application of the Secondary Boycott and Hot Cargo Provisions,
48 Guo. L.J. 354 (1959).
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Nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a
labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to
the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the
construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or
other work."
The purpose of the exemption"3 was to provide a workable solution to the
problem which arises when union men are forced to work alongside non-
union men on the same construction project."4
The scope of the construction industry exception was a subject of con-
troversy when enacted. The difficulty arose in determining whether it was
meant to include work that could be performed at the construction site
or only work actually done at the construction site. The disagreement
over the phrase "to be done at the site of the construction" arose mainly
in regard to "fabrication clauses" in plumbing contracts. This type of
clause might provide that the cutting, bending or fitting of pipe shall be
done either at the employer's shop or at the job site. Since the fabrication
is not actually required at the job site, this type of subcontracting clause
would not be protected by the proviso if the "work actually done at the
job site" interpretation is accepted. On the other hand, since the work
could be done at the job site, the clause would be protected under the
"could be performed" interpretation. The Board finally held that this ex-
emption for the construction industry applies only to work actually done
at the construction site."0 It does not apply or extend to work done away
from the construction site even though the work could be considered as
part of the construction process and could have been done at the construc-
tion site.
Section 8 (e)'s second proviso grants a similar exception for the garment
industry. It states that:
[F]or the purposes of this subsection (e) and Section 8 (b) (4) (A) the terms
'any employer' 'any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting
commerce' and 'any person' when used in relation to the terms 'any other,
producer, processor, or manufacturer' 'any other employer' or 'any other
person' shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer,
contractor or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber
or manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production
in the apparel and clothing industry.57
The secondary activity prohibited by section 8 (b) (4) (A) and the con-
tracts or agreements banned by section 8 (e) were still considered lawful
in three situations within the garment industry. The exemption is limited
a2 2 9 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
" This situation has been described by Justice Douglas as "A basic protest in trade union history."
NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Trade Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
14 The exemption can be attributed in part to Justice Douglas' dissent in NLRB v. Denver Bldg.
& Trade Council, id.
" The § 8 (e) proviso sanctions contractual arrangements whereby a general contractor agrees
that all subcontractors on a construction project will hire union labor. It is relatively clear that
under both interpretations contractual arrangements whereby a general contractor agrees to the
employment of union labor by all subcontractors on a construction project are allowed. See Com-
ment, supra note 41, at 751.
"s Carpenters, Ohio Valley Dist. Council (Cardinal Industries), 136 N.L.R.B. 977 (1962).
5'29 U.S.C. S 158(e) (1964).
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to persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or sub-
contractor (1) working on the goods of the jobber or manufacturer, (2)
working on the premises of the jobber or manufacturer, or (3) perform-
ing parts of an integrated process of production in the garment industry."s
The purpose behind the garment industry exemption can be under-
stood by looking at the nature of that business. The industry is located in
cities with easy access to loft rental space. Garments are marketed by job-
bers who buy the piece goods, plan the designs, and finally contract out the
required cutting and sewing. The machinery used in the operation is easily
transported by the subcontractors from one loft to another. For a long
time employees were subjected to low wages and poor working conditions
because a jobber who had entered a union contract fixing a fair minimum
wage could avoid the contract by sending the cutting and sewing to a
hidden sweatshop which did not pay the minimum wage. The union usual-
ly could not locate and organize the sewing shop until the work was
completed. The jobber would then give the next contract to another
shop which was hidden in a different loft. Fair contractors were forced
by this sweatshop competition to either cut wages below the union scale
or go out of business. The fairminded employers and the union soon
learned through experience that the union had to persuade jobbers to agree
to refrain from doing business with contractors who had not signed con-
tracts with the union."
The third proviso to section 8 (e)" declares: "That nothing in this Act
shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the fore-
going exception."'" Thus the proviso declares that the section 8 (e) re-
striction on hot cargo agreements is not to be applied to such agreements
in the garment industry. These agreements can be enforced through the
use of strikes, picketing, or other economic pressures. It is important to
note, however, that this exception applies only to the garment industry
and has no effect on the construction industry exemption which appar-
ently is still governed by the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sand Door.
Clearly, with the enactment of section 8 (e) of the Landrum-Grifinm
Act the future of hot cargo agreements in labor-management contracts
appeared unfavorable except in the two excluded industries. The clauses
were now illegal when entered into between labor organizations and em-
ployers. However, further litigation was to arise concerning the issue of
whether certain other kinds of agreements between unions and employers
constituted the forbidden hot cargo agreements.
IV. THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 8 (e)
The NLRB originally gave section 8 (e) a literal and broad interpreta-
"s Therefore the proviso does not permit a union to'use a secondary boycott or execute a hot
cargo contract where either the disputing or neutral employer is a retailer or wholesaler. 29 U.S.C.
S 158(e) (1964).
"9See 105 CONG. REc. 15222 (1959) (remarks of Senator Kennedy and Representative Thomp-
son).




tion in accord with what it believed to be congressional intent. In Lithog-
raphers Local 78 (Employing Lithographers of Greater Miami) " the Board
held that in enacting section 8 (e) Congress intended to reach every device
which amounts to an agreement that the contracting employer will not
handle the goods of another employer or cease doing business with another
person. This broad interpretation resulted in an "effect" as opposed to an
"object" test for determining the validity of a clause. "3 The Board felt that
Congress intended that section 8 (e) extend not only to contracts which
by their intended effect or operation achieve the same result. "4 Thus any
agreement authorizing employees to refuse to handle another employer's
goods was a hot cargo agreement and prohibited by section 8 (e).
In Orange Belt District Council of Painters v. NLRB"5 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia overruled the Board's test and held
that the matter of legality under section 8 (e) is whether the clause is
addressed to the labor relations of the primary or secondary employer.
Thus an "object" test was used. The Court stated:
We have phrased the test as whether the clauses are 'germane to the eco-
nomic integrity of the principal work unit' and seek 'to protect and preserve
the work and standards (the union) has bargained for'; or instead 'extend
beyond the (contracting) employer' and are aimed really at the union's dif-
ference with another employer."
The proper test for determining legality was again considered in
Teamsters Local 710 (Wilson & Co.),"' which involved the Meat Packers
in Chicago. The packers had agreed over a twenty-year period that deliv-
eries of meat products to customers within the Chicago area would be
made using the packers' trucks driven by union employees. During this
period, deliveries in the Chicago area originated from plants in Chicago,
but when the three major packers, Swift, Armour, and Wilson relocated
outside of Chicago, a sharp reduction in employment of the union drivers
occurred. Deliveries were increasingly being made by over-the-road driv-
ers originating from the packers' facilities outside of the Chicago area.
The union, in an attempt to recover the jobs lost by the local drivers in
the Chicago area and to retain those jobs still performed there, proposed
that a work allocation clause be included in the bargaining agreement re-
quiring that all deliveries in Chicago, whether from within the city or out
of state, be made by local employees covered by the agreement. The Board
held that the clause provided for "work acquisition" and not "work
62 130 N.L.R.B. 968, 976 (1961), enforced as modified, 301 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1962).
63 See Beins, job Security and Subcontracting Bargaining: The Sword and the Shield, Sw. LE-
GAL FOUNDATION 1968 INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW, LABOR LAW PROBLEMS.
'"See Local 107, Highway Truck Drivers (E.A. Gallagher & Sons), 131 N.L.R.B. 925, 930
(1961), enforced, 302 F.2d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
6" 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
"Id. at 538. See also Teamsters Local 413 (Patton Warehouse), 140 N.L.R.B. 1474, 1485
(1963); Teamsters Local 728 (Brown Transport Co.), 140 N.L.R.B. 436 (1963), consolidated and
enforced in part and rev'd in part, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916
(1964).
67 143 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1963), enforced in part, rev'd in part, and remanded in part, 335 F.2d
709 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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preservation" and was secondary in nature."8 However, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia overruled the Board and held that
"delivery in the Chicago area irrespective of origin of the shipment, is
work fairly claimable by the union.""s The court went on to say that this
attempt by the union to maintain and regain the local delivery jobs was a
typical primary activity and was valid under section 8 (e).7 The court
upheld the union provision on the basis of the Orange Belt case and thus
recognized the "object" test.7' Under these decisions if the union's object
was primary in nature, clauses securing this object would be valid. Even
though cessation of business relationships may result as an incident to the
primary activity this is still not enough to establish an unlawful secondary
object under section 8 (e).7
V. NATIONAL WOODWORK MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION v. NLRB-
PRIMARY ACTIVITY AND WORK PRESERVATION
Finally the Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of whether
or not a work preservation clause was a hot cargo agreement. In National
Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB" the Manufacturers As-
sociation attempted to have these work preservation clauses included in
the class of "hot cargo agreements." If this type of agreement is deemed
a hot cargo clause then it would naturally be outlawed under section 8 (e)
of the Landrum-Griffin Act. The case arose in connection with the con-
struction of a Philadelphia housing project. Frouge, the general contractor,
had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Carpenters'
International Union, specifying that Frouge was bound by the rules and
regulations in effect between local unions and contractors in areas in
which Frouge had jobs. Frouge was therefore subject to the collective
bargaining agreement between the union and an organization of Philadel-
phia contractors known as the General Building Contractors Association,
Inc. The agreement provided that "no member of the District Council
will handle .. .any doors .. .which have been fitted prior to being fur-
nished on the job . . . ., Frouge contracted for the purchase of pre-
machined doors from a manufacturer who was a member of the National
Woodwork Manufacturers Association. When the doors arrived at the
6' 143 N.L.R.B. at 1221.
" 335 F.2d at 714.
70 Id.
71 See Beins, supra note 63.
72 Id.
73386 U.S. 612 (1967).
71 The text of the relevant part of the agreement was as follows:
No employee shall work on any job on which cabinet work, fixtures, mill work, sash
doors, trim or other detailed millwork is used unless the same is union made and bears
the union label of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. No
member of this district council will handle material coming from a mill where cutting
out and fitting has been done for butts, locks, letter places or hardware of any descrip-
tion nor any doors or transoms which have been fitted prior to being furnished on the
job including base, chair, rail, picture moulding which has been previously fitted. This
section to exempt partition work furnished in sections.
The first sentence of this rule was held by the Board to violate § 8 (e) and the Union did not seek
judicial review of this holding. 386 U.S. 612, 615 (1967).
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job site, the union ordered its carpenters not to hang the doors. Frouge
then withdrew the prefabricated doors and replaced them with "blank"
doors which were hung by the carpenters after being fitted and cut. The
National Woodwork Manufacturers Association filed charges with the
National Labor Relations Board against the union claiming that by in-
cluding the "will not handle" sentence in the contract the union had com-
mitted the unfair labor practice proscribed by section 8 (e) of entering into
an "agreement ... whereby ... the . . . employer . . . agrees to cease or
refrain from handling ...any of the products of any other employer
S. .' and also that the union had committed the unfair labor practice
under section 8 (b) (4) (B) of forcing or requiring any person "to cease
using ...the products of any other ...manufacturer.""8 The charges
against the union were dismissed by the National Labor Relations Board."
The Board adopted the trial examiner's finding that the "will not handle"
sentence in the agreement was to "protect and preserve cutting out and
fitting as unit work to be performed by the jobsite carpenters."W The
Board also adopted the trial examiner's finding that the agreement and
its enforcement against Frouge constituted primary activity outside the
sections 8 (e) and 8 (b) (4) (B) prohibitions." The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed the Board and held that the agreement
violated section 8 (e)." The Supreme Court granted certiorari8' and re-
versed the Seventh Circuit's decision on section 8 (e)."
The Supreme Court held that the union did not violate the hot cargo
provisions of section 8 (e) of the NLRA by including in their contract the
provision that no union member will handle any doors fitted prior to being
furnished on the job. The Court also held that the secondary boycott
provisions of section 8 (b) (4) (B) were not violated by the union's in-
structions to the carpenters to refrain from installing the doors. The con-
tract provision was viewed by the Court as a valid work preservation
clause and the union enforcement of this clause was considered as being
instituted to maintain the traditional jobsite work of the boycotting car-
penters in relation to their own employer. The activities of the union were
held not to be done in order to secure benefits for others than the boycot-
ting employees or to gain union objectives in regard to neutral employers.
In reaching its decision the Court reviewed the history of labor legislation
with particular emphasis on the Taft-Hartley Act and the Landrum-
Griffin Act and concluded that Congress intended for sections 8 (e) and
8 (b) (4) (B) to prohibit only secondary objectives."
The Court in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association relied on
'6386 U.S. at 615.
71 Id.
'Carpenters Union (National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n), 149 N.L.R.B. 646 (1964).
78386 U.S. at 615.
79 Id.
80 354 F.2d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 1965).
s'384 U.S. 968 (1966).





Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Electrical Workers8 as support for the prop-
osition that the "will not handle" sentence was a violation of sections 8 (e)
and 8 (b) (4) (B). Allen Bradley8 concerned a combination between unions
and electrical contractors in New York City in an attempt to monopolize
the work of that area. In distinguishing the National Woodwork from
the Allen Bradley case the court stated:
[T]he boycott in Allen Bradley was carried on not as a shield to preserve
the jobs of Local 3 members, traditionally a primary labor activity, but as
a sword, to reach out and monopolize all the manufacturing job tasks for
Local 3 members. It is arguable that Congress may have viewed the use of
the boycott as a sword as different from labor's traditional concerns with
wages, hours, and working conditions. But the boycott in the present case was
not used as a sword; it was a shield carried solely to preserve the members'jobs. We, therefore, have no occasion today to decide the questions which
might arise where the workers carry on a boycott to reach out to monopolize
jobs or acquire new job tasks when their own jobs are not threatened by
the boycotted product.87
Thus, the distinguishing element is the object of the activity. If the ac-
tivity is carried on for its effect outside of the immediate employer's area,
it is prohibited. But the traditional primary activity is still lawful even
though it may have some effects on secondary employers.
The Court in National Woodwork then went on to a consideration of
whether section 8 (e) of the Landrum-Griffin Act as enacted by Congress
made an agreement such as that between the union and the Philadelphia
Contractors Association in itself unlawful. The legislative history of sec-
tion 8 (e) was interpreted to mean that the section did not prohibit agree-
ments made for the preservation of work. The Court stated:
[A]lthough the language of 8(e) is sweeping, it closely tracks that of
8(b) (4) (A), and just as the latter and its successor 8(b) (4) (B) did not
reach employees' activity to pressure their employer to preserve for them-
selves work traditionally done by them, 8 (e) does not prohibit agreements
made and maintained for that purpose.88
In conclusion the Court looked at the "will not handle" sentence of the
agreement in order to determine if this was a violation of sections 8 (e)
and 8 (b) (4) (B). The Court held that the objective of the sentence was
"preservation of work traditionally performed by the jobsite carpenters"
and did not amount to a violation of either of the provisions. The union
had refused to hang prefabricated doors regardless of whether they bore
a union label and had even refused to install prefabricated doors that had
been manufactured off the job site by members of the union. This and
'5325 U.S. 797 (1944).
" The Allen Bradley case involved a situation where a union combined with electrical con-
tractors and manufacturers of electrical fixtures in New York for the purpose of restraining the
introduction of such equipment from areas outside of the city. The contractors were to limit their
purchases to local manufacturers only and these manufacturers limited their New York City sales
to contractors employing members of the union. The plan was enforced through the threat of a
boycott by the contractors' employees. The Supreme Court held that this activity was a violation
of § 8 (b) (4) as an attempt to "abet contractors and manufacturers to create a monopoly."




other evidence89 substantiated the Court's holding90 that the "object" of
the conduct on the Frouge job site was only to preserve the traditional
work of the jobsite carpenters."
The question arises as to whether the construction industry exemption
in section 8 (e) could have been applied to the agreement invoked in
National Woodwork. The work involved could have been performed at
the job site. Therefore under the liberal interpretation of the exemption
the argument could be made that the agreement came under the construc-
tion industry exemption. Under the stricter interpretation recognized by
the Board the exemption would not apply because the work was not ac-
tually done at the job site. Although this issue was clearly present in the
National Woodwork case the Court did not find it necessary to decide the
question. Since the purpose of the agreement was found by the Court to
be the retention of work within the bargaining unit, it was classed as a
work preservation clause. There was no dispute with an unfair employer or
any desire by the union to exert secondary pressure. The objectives of the
agreement were found to be primary and as a result section 8 (e) was not
applied; hence it was unnecessary for the Court to consider the problem
of whether the agreement could also be protected by the construction
industry exemption."
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty years hot cargo agreements have gradually fallen
out of favor with Congress and the courts. The ruling in Conway's Ex-
press that a hot cargo clause was a valid defense to a secondary boycott
charge marks the high point for proponents of the hot cargo agreement.
Most of the developments after Conway were downhill for the clause.
The main objection that Congress and the courts seem to have to these
agreements is their deleterious effect on the economy by restraining the free
flow of goods and their involuntary inclusion of neutral employers.
While at first glance National Woodwork may appear to set forth a rea-
sonable exception, the argument that the clause in National Woodwork
actually does transgress the words of the statute can be made with force.
Under the statute a boycott is unlawful when an object thereof "is forcing
or requiring any person to cease using ... the products of any other man-
ufacturer."9 An agreement whereby an employer "agrees to cease or re-
frain from handling . . . any of the products of any other employer is
s' Id. at 649.
" In a dissent, Justice Stewart joined by three other Justices voiced the opinion that legislative
history confirms the plain meaning of the statute and points out that the union produced boycott
and the agreement authorizing it were unfair labor practices. Stewart felt that the majority was
substituting "its own notions of sound labor policy for the word of Congress." 386 U.S. at 650.
9' In a companion case to National Woodwork, Houston Insulation Contractors v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 664 (1967), the Supreme Court held similar primary activity protected under the same reason-
ing set forth in National Woodwork.
9229 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
93 See Comment, Subcontracting Clauses and Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act,
62 MIcH. L. REv. 1176, 1177 (1964).
9429 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4)(B) (1964).
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also unlawful." The express words of the statute clearly prohibit the ac-
tivity disputed in National Woodwork. Even though the union's purpose
was the preservation of work through primary activity, a result of this
activity was a boycott which forced an employer to cease using the pro-
ducts of a certain manufacturer. It cannot be said that work preserva-
tion boycotts do not interfere with the free flow of goods, for they do.9"
These boycotts may be permanent in character and "the restraint on the
free flow of goods in commerce is direct and pervasive, not limited to
goods manufactured by a particular employer with whom the union has
a dispute.""
On the other hand, it is clear that to take away from workers the
weapon which affords protection against the employer's efforts to abolish
their jobs would be a harsh remedy in this age of automation. To so hold
there must be substantial legislative materials in the form of debates and
data along with the actual legislation indicating such a purpose. Unfor-
tunately, there is very little in the congressional records on sections
8 (b) (4) and 8 (e) which relate to this question. As the Court stated "The
silence regarding such matters in the Eighty-sixth Congress is itself evi-
dence that Congress, in enacting section 8 (e), had no thought of prohib-
iting agreements directed to work preservation." 7
Therefore, in light of this fact, it appears that the majority's ruling is
proper since the Court should not outlaw such activity until Congress has
clearly indicated that it desires to completely eliminate this method of
employee protection.
In determining the boundary lines for hot cargo agreements in the
future it is accurate to say that they are outlawed by section 8 (e) of the
Landrum-Griffin Act with certain exceptions, namely the construction
and garment industry exemptions expressed in the proviso to section 8 (e)
and valid work preservation clauses with primary objectives as set out in
the National Woodwork case. Work preservation clauses will be allowed
as long as their purpose is to retain work for the union members and
there are no secondary objectives. Unless Congress sees fit to do away
with this exception by legislation, the National Woodwork doctrine will
allow considerable union activity in this area with results not only in the
realm of work preservation, but also with the additional effect of depriv-
ing some secondary employers of business due to the protected work
preservation clauses.
's See Comment, supra note 93.
9386 U.S. 660, 661 (1967).
9 See J. Harlan's opinion at 386 U.S. 612, 648 (1967).
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